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1. Introduction   
The integration of national economies has no legitimacy in its own right. People do not fall in 
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the European Union’s efforts to involve civil society actors in political processes. Social 
partners were of particular importance here (1). The involvement of trade unions and employer 
organisations in both the formulation and implementation of policy became a blueprint for 
good governance. This is indicated in both the White Paper on “European Governance” (CEC 
2001) and by the promotion of social dialogue in new member states. According to the 
Commission, social dialogue is a “key to better governance” (CEC 2002: 4).  
Recent years have seen the emergence of modes of governance that correspond to this 
approach to European policy-making, especially in social and employment policy. With the
Maastricht Treaty organised labour and employers became co-legislators of EU social policy. 
In the European Employment Strategy (EES), they are called upon to contribute to national 
action plans and to the implementation of EU guidelines. More recently, however, this positive 
revaluation of social partners has been associated with the proliferation of less binding 
decision-making methods. For example, there has been an increase in the number of
autonomously implemented agreements among the EU social partners that are binding for the 
member organisations but not for all employees (depending on the reach of collective 
agreements). Furthermore, soft law instruments have been extended to social dialogue that 
now also operates with non-binding targets and mutual monitoring rather than giving rise to 
legislation. Consequently, a “double voluntarism” relating to both the content of policy and to 
its procedural aspects can be observed in European social dialogue and employment policy (2). 
The aim of this article is to examine the emergence and limitations of those new modes of 
governance that have been adopted in the EU since the beginning of the nineties, namely EU 
social dialogue and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The next section discusses the 
literature on new modes of governance. We argue that too little attention has been paid to the 
relationship between government and governance (but see Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) 
leading to a rather benign view of this research on the problem-solving capacity of policy-
making in the European Union (see Büchs this issue). Our analysis seeks to contrast this view. 
In the third section, we describe how new modes of governance have developed in 
employment and social policy. According to our argument, they were a reaction to a lack of 
consensus about what kind of labour market and social policy should accompany Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). Only an agreement to non-binding procedures was possible in 
the face of substantial disagreement among the member states and employers’ opposition. 
Putting new modes of governance into the context of other forms of policy-making, section 
four discusses some of their limitations. The final section summarises the findings.  
2. Decentralised polity, centralised society?   
In his famous study of the “semisovereign” (West-)German state, Katzenstein (1985) 
demonstrated that a weak, decentralised state does not prevent successful policies – if 
complemented by centralised society. In the German case, the dispersion of state power among 
competing institutions was counterbalanced by the concentration of private power in large 
social groups, among others by powerful employer associations and trade unions. 
Paradoxically, under these circumstances state weakness – at least until the late 1980s – turned 
out to be a strength (Streeck 2005). Compared to Germany at that time, the European Union is 
but an extreme example of a decentralised polity. Even though it has constantly been gaining 
competences and many of its decisions affect the member states, the ability of the centre to act 
autonomously of the federal units is limited. This holds true in particular for social policy and 
industrial relations, where governments, management and labour cautiously defend their 
prerogative to act. Hence, by the late 1980s the lesson had been learned that the EU would not 
replicate the path of a nation state and acquire ever more competences in social policy. In this 
area, the Union was bound to remain a weak, highly decentralised state. As a result, the 
Commission reinvigorated its attempts to centralize society (3). Through financial aid and 
institutional incentives, the Commission wanted to nourish interest representation as well as 
corporatist policy-making (see the contributions in Eising and Kohler-Koch 2005) at the 
European level hoping that society-building could overcome the weakness of the political
© 2009 by Armin Schäfer and Simone Leiber
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-009a.htm 2centre. Since the EU will for the foreseeable future stay “semisovereign” the road ahead may 
lie in further centralizing society.  
The “governance turn” in EU studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006) mirrored the political 
turn towards “civil society.” (4) As hierarchical government or hard law was not available in
important fields of EU policy, attention shifted to other actors who could possibly fill the void. 
This new orientation was facilitated by the fact that a focus on governance can be fruitfully 
combined with other theories in three respects. First, reference to a decision-making mode 
specific to the EU supports the idea of a political system sui generis. Non-hierarchical modes 
of governance are not considered deficient but rather a logical consequence of the multi-level 
nature of the polity. Soft coordination, from this point of view, is a superior mode of 
governance as it promotes flexibility and learning (see Kohler-Koch 1996; Trubek and Trubek 
2005). Second, rather than stressing conflict, EU policy-making has often been characterised 
as a problem-solving exercise. Procedures that build on cooperation and argumentation comply 
well with this image (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002; Radaelli 2003). Finally, turning from 
government to governance opens a point of contact to deliberative and participatory 
democracy, such as that promoted for example by Cohen and Sabel (1997) (5).  
Arguably this view of European governance was in part due to the selectivity of the chosen 
perspective. The debate has primarily been developed on the basis of those policy areas in 
which new modes of governance were applied. It has less frequently been asked under which 
circumstances new modes are chosen and which restrictions follow from the existing body of 
hard law, ECJ case law, or non-decisions. Taking these restrictions into account shows that the
boundaries in which for example the European Employment Strategy can search for solutions 
are rather narrow (Scharpf 2002: 655). Neither monetary, fiscal nor industrial policy can be 
enlisted to ease unemployment; it is virtually impossible to justify exceptions to the four 
freedoms before the Commission und the European Court of Justice for the sake of social 
policy objectives as the recent Laval, Viking, and Rüffert decisions demonstrate; ambitious 
programmes that follow the model of the New Deal could not be introduced without a radical 
redefinition of the nature of the EU Treaties and a new mandate for supranational actors – yet, 
such changes are highly unlikely (Bartolini 2006: 46).  
What is more, quite frequently governance depends on government to work effectively 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) and, more specifically, European social dialogue depends on the 
“shadow of hierarchy” (Smismans 2008). In particular employers engage in negotiations with 
trade unions at the EU level only if they have to fear that their unwillingness to act will trigger 
a political response of the Commission and the Council. However, the theoretical challenge is 
to define under what circumstances those actors (principals) are willing and able to coerce 
agents to act. We suggest that the shading of the shadow of hierarchy depends not least on the 
party-political complexion of the Council of Ministers. While the end of the 1990s saw an
unprecedented wave of social democratic governments in the member states this wave has 
ebbed away since then. By now, a majority of member states are governed by centre-right 
parties, there is a centre-right majority in the European Parliament and the Commission
President is a conservative. The supporters of the “project of regulated capitalism” (Hooghe 
and Marks 1999) – who mainly pushed for European social dialogue and the EES – are much 
weaker than a decade ago. At the same time, EU member states have grown highly diverse in 
terms of their welfare states and production regimes, which makes it more challenging to find 
uniform social standards.  
3. The emergence of new modes of governance in social dialogue and 
employment policy   
For methodological reasons (Zeitlin 2009: 214-215; Kröger this issue) evaluating top-down 
Europeanisation effects of new EU modes of governance on national labour-market and social 
policy is a difficult task that is not pursued in this article. Looking at reasons for the emergence 
of these new governance procedures (see this section) as well as at principal limitations of the 
governance modes, arising among other things from a strong interrelation of governance and 
© 2009 by Armin Schäfer and Simone Leiber
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-009a.htm 3government as well as “hard” and “soft” governance mechanisms (see section four), should, 
however, contribute to our understanding of how these new modes of governance may or may 
not affect policy-making in the European Union. In this section we argue that the creation of 
flexible modes of governance in labour market and social policy that do not strive for uniform 
solutions at several stages has helped to overcome political stalemate in the Council. Non-
binding decision-making procedures and the delegation of authority to social partners 
alleviated the pressure to come to an agreement.  
At the end of the 1990s, the Open Method of Coordination provided the EU with a new “soft”
coordination process (6), which initially appeared to be a prime example of what the 
governance approach postulated for the change of policy-making in Europe: Governance takes 
place without the classical instruments of hierarchical control. At the same time, there was an 
increase – at least in discourse and regarding the formal rules – in the importance of networks 
and civil society actors such as the social partners. However, it is not only in the OMC that 
social partners have gained weight in shaping European policy over the last 20 years. Social 
dialogue is no longer a purely national phenomenon since management and labour have 
become potential co-legislators of EU social policy with the Maastricht Treaty (e.g. Falkner 
1998). And yet, following a heyday in the 1990s, there are signs that social dialogue is – in the 
absence of political backing – currently softening in order to overcome the non-committed 
position of the employers. Instruments that were first used with the OMC have by now been 
picked up by the social partners – pushing EU governance towards a twofold voluntarism. 
Rather than moving from a weak state to strong society, we observe weak social partners and a 
weak political decision-making centre. In the following we describe these developments in
detail by distinguishing four (partly overlapping) phases: The period prior to Maastricht 
characterised by a precedence of negative integration; the period from Maastricht to the end of 
the 1990s, where we observe a heyday of social dialogue and social policy directives; the turn 
to non-binding coordination in employment and social policy since the end of the 1990s;
finally, with the new century the turn to non-binding coordination also in the realm of social 
dialogue that we call the double voluntarism.  
3.1. The precedence of negative integration   
In the phase prior to Maastricht, EU social policy was characterised above all by what Scharpf 
(1988) termed the “joint decision trap” and what Streeck (1995b) went on to describe as the 
“corporatist decision-making gap.” The demand for consensus in the Council repeatedly led to
a blockage of the Commission’s social policy initiatives. Consequently, attempts to advance
social policy in Europe often failed. An exception is the equal treatment of women and men, 
which had already been regulated in the Treaty of Rome. Especially the European Court of 
Justice has been actively pushing for a broad implementation of this principle (cf. Ostner and 
Lewis 1998). In the mid 1980s, the Single European Act led to the introduction of qualified 
majority decision-making in the area of workplace health and safety. This also resulted in an 
appreciable body of regulations and a high level of protection in this area (Falkner et al. 2005: 
ch. 3).  
In contrast, cross-industry social dialogue between management and labour on the European
level offered a reserved picture at that point in time. In fact, Art. 193-198 of the Treaties of 
Rome included provisions for creation of the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) (7), 
which, however, did not develop into an effective channel of influence for the social partners 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 138). The committee was supposed to mirror the French Comité 
Économique et Social. Its members were selected by governments rather than by the 
associations themselves, and the ESC made only non-binding statements, which have not been 
very influential. Also the tripartite conciliation process that came into life in the 1970s failed 
due to employer opposition. The same happened to the Val Duchesse dialogue starting in the 
mid-1980s between representatives of the European Commission and the three largest 
European social partner organisations (at that time UNICE (8), CEEP and ETUC) (9). Even 
then, though, the Commission hoped that deadlock in the Council would be overcome with the 
assistance of social dialogue (Falkner 2000: 14). And yet, it was not possible to evade the 
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establishing EU regulation in addition to existing national regulations. Because at government 
level European social policy was firmly caught in the “joint decision trap”, employers hardly 
had to concern themselves about regulation by the Council at that time. Hence they did not 
make themselves available as a negotiating partner. In spite of strenuous attempts of several 
member states and the European Commission, the development of European social policy and 
social dialogue was only rudimentary in the pre-Maastricht phase.  
3.2. Functional Subsidiarity   
The Maastricht Treaty and the annexed Social Protocol ushered in a new phase of EU policy-
making as the social partners were authorised to draft legislation (e.g. Dølvik 1997: 189-240; 
Falkner 1998: 78-96; Keller and Sörries 1999). Four institutional innovations were introduced
in social policy:  
1. New competences were created,  
2. the scope of qualified majority voting was expanded,  
3. the European Parliament was strengthened, and  
4. European social partners were accorded much more significance.  
These changes introduced a new mode of governance to the EU: Complementing the 
Community Method, the “social partner procedure” allows management and labour to 
negotiate Framework Agreements. At their request, these agreements can be transformed into a 
Directive by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. In this case the only 
available option of the Council is to either accept or reject it in its entirety. The Maastricht 
Treaty also sought to strengthen national social partners. It introduced the possibility to entrust 
management and labour with the implementation of Directives, if they requested to do so.  
Through the social partner procedure, organised labour and employer associations have been 
given the authority to participate directly in the creation of EU social policy. In some 
instances, this authority even exceeds that of national associations, although collective 
agreements are customary in most EU countries. However, the negotiation of social policy or 
labour law standards with an erga omnes effect by the state (in this case, by the Council of 
Ministers), beyond the issues of wages and working time, was known above all from Belgium 
(10). Thus, while the Union’s social policy competencies have remained limited, the social 
partner procedure nonetheless represents an innovation in European policy-making. This new 
mode of governance can be seen as the first step in a series of procedural answers to 
intergovernmental blockades to EU social policy. Shifting decision-making to management 
and labour is a case of “functional subsidiarity” (Streeck 1998: 410), which frees the Council 
from the obligation to act. At the same time, the threat to use qualified majority in the Council 
– the “shadow of hierarchy” – puts pressure on the employers to engage in negotiations with
trade unions as they can no longer be sure that social policy initiatives will be blocked in the 
Council.  
Indeed, during the 1990s, cross-industry social dialogue resulted in three agreements 
implemented by Council Directive, on parental leave (1995), part-time work (1997) and fixed-
term contracts (1999). In contrast, the social partners failed to agree (on negotiations) 
concerning four other initiatives – the European works councils, the burden of proof in cases 
of discrimination, sexual harassment in the workplace and the information and consultation of 
employees – by the end of the 1990s. As a consequence, the respective Directives were passed 
via the normal EU legislative procedure instead (11). In sum, the 1990s not only saw the 
establishment of a new mode of governance – cross-industry social dialogue – but also a 
number of social policy Directives (Falkner et al. 2005). However, it is worth noting that these 
developments took place under favourable political circumstances. In the second half of the 
1990s, social democratic parties governed in three out of four member states. Despite 
differences between Third Way- and more traditional Social Democrats, these governments
were generally sympathetic to EU social policy (Manow, Schäfer and Zorn 2004; see section 
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3.3. Non-binding Coordination   
In the phase following Maastricht, the willingness to strengthen the European profile in the 
fight against unemployment increased. While the Maastricht Treaty had been strongly 
influenced by Christian Democratic and Liberal Parties (Johansson 2002), the party-political 
centre of gravity began moving leftwards during the 1990s. Consequently, the call to more 
actively tackle unemployment grew stronger, also because after Maastricht governments felt in 
need to counterbalance economic and monetary integration by a social dimension of Europe. 
Governments agreed to make the fight against unemployment a priority of EU activities at the 
Essen Summit in December 1994. Core elements of the OMC – common objectives, national 
implementation, monitoring by the Commission and other member states – were put in place 
already then (Goetschy 1999).  
Although the Essen procedure remained largely inconsequential, it nonetheless served as a 
template for the European Employment Strategy, which was introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997. At the Luxembourg summit later the same year, governments drew not 
only on the Essen procedure but also on the multilateral surveillance process that had become 
known as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. They transferred this sanction-free 
coordination of national policies to employment policy. The Commission proposed more 
rigorous a set of employment guidelines and urged member states to accept clearly specified 
quantitative targets but failed to overcome their resistance. Reducing employment policies to a 
voluntary opportunity for learning without obligatory targets facilitated support for it. In sum, 
the turn towards soft law in employment policy ensured that the negotiations were not 
deadlocked over substantive disagreements (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006: 36; Schäfer 
2006b).  
In Lisbon, this procedure was dubbed the OMC and it was simultaneously bound to a new 
strategic goal, which was intended to turn “the union into the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economic region in the world” and to create the necessary conditions for 
“full employment” (European Council 2000). With the OMC, it seems that a template for
political coordination was found that above all serves the interests of participating 
governments. Visser (2005) sees the OMC as a “selective amplifier” that matters only if 
governments want to act in any case. Soft coordination sidelines the European Court of Justice 
and the Commission and marginalises the influence of the European Parliament. Ironically, the 
OMC seems to be more firmly intergovernmental than traditional modes of governance such as 
the Community method. The Commission therefore seeks to limit the OMC to those areas that 
have no basis in the Treaties (CEC 2003: 9).  
In the aftermath of the Lisbon summit, the OMC proliferated in a number of (social) policy 
fields, such as e.g. pensions, health care, social inclusion, and elderly care (Hodson and Maher 
2001: 726). As these processes were not well integrated and the “flow of work [was] 
somewhat haphazard” (CEC 2003: 8), first the EES and in subsequent years diverse OMC 
procedures were streamlined. Most importantly, in 2003 the EES was organisationally merged 
with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and put on a three year schedule. Rather than 
drawing up new guidelines each year, they should remain stable for an extended period of 
time. In addition to the reorganisation of the process, the mid-term review of the Lisbon 
Strategy’s effects was sobering. An expert group led by former Dutch Prime Minister Wim
Kok concluded that “much needs to be done in order to prevent Lisbon from becoming a 
synonym for missed objectives and failed promises” (High Level Group 2004: 10). To prevent 
this from happening, the Lisbon Strategy was relaunched in 2005. One of the main goals was 
to ensure delivery that had not been forthcoming until then. The new Lisbon Action 
Programme focuses on the completion of the internal market and builds on three overarching 
aims:  
1. Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work; 
© 2009 by Armin Schäfer and Simone Leiber
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-009a.htm 62. knowledge and innovation for growth; and 
3. creating more and better jobs (CEC 2005: 15).  
However, as the deadline of 2010 approaches in the midst of an economic crisis, it seems clear 
that the EU will miss most, if not all of the goals announced at the Lisbon summit in 2000 (see 
Pochet, Boulin and Dufour 2009).  
3.4. Double Voluntarism   
The Laeken Summit at the end of 2001 can be seen as another important turning point in the 
governance of EU social policy. On the occasion of the summit, social partners presented a 
common statement with a previously unknown emphasis on bipartite social dialogue. This 
heralded developments towards an increasingly independent and autonomous European social 
dialogue, which incorporates elements of the OMC (Leiber and Falkner 2006; Smismans 2008: 
171-172). While this does not mean that legally binding instruments have become irrelevant
(Falkner et al. 2005: ch. 3), voluntary instruments were nonetheless gaining in significance. 
OMC procedures have become part of the social dialogue of management and labour. While 
their negotiations resulted in a number of Framework Agreements during the 1990s, the so-
called “new generation joint texts” no longer aim at binding EU regulation. According to the 
Commission, there are now two social partner strategies: „Autonomous agreements and 
process-oriented texts which make recommendations of various kinds (frameworks of action, 
guidelines, codes of conduct, and policy orientations). The essential difference is that 
agreements are to be implemented and monitored by a given date, whereas the second kind 
entails a more process-oriented approach” (CEC 2004: 7). In particular the latter approach 
resembles the OMC.  
The Framework Agreement on fixed-term contracts in 1999 marks the last time that EU social
partners achieved a successful cross-sector agreement that was subsequently turned into an EU
Directive (12). Since then, autonomous agreements on telework (2002), work-related stress 
(2004), and harassment and violence at work (2007) have been signed. Cross-industry social 
dialogue also led to “frameworks for action”, on the lifelong development of competencies and 
qualifications (2002), gender equality (2005) and a host of “process oriented texts” such as 
Guidelines and Policy Orientations – all of which are not legally enforceable and rely on
mutual monitoring, learning and good will (see CEC 2008 for an encompassing overview). 
Most of these measures are laid down in the social partners’ second “Work 
Programme” (2006-2008) (13). Interestingly, this document does not make any reference to 
the possibility of negotiating Framework Agreements.  
In recent years, social dialogue has also shifted from the cross-industry to the sectoral level 
(Dufresne, Degryse and Pochet 2006). At present, it takes place in 36 different sectors dealing 
mainly with industry-specific questions at a European level. Sectoral social dialogue 
committees regularly focus on training, working time and conditions, health and safety, 
sustainable development, and free movement of workers. These committees have adopted 
several hundred joint texts including Joint Opinions and Agreements, Guidelines and Codes of 
Conduct. Pochet (2007) analyses 281 texts adopted between 1997 and 2006. While the sectoral 
social partner committees are very active, a mere 2 percent of all documents contain binding 
agreements. Most other documents do not commit the social partners to take action or remain, 
as the Commission criticises, excessively vague (CEC 2004: 14). Other authors conclude that 
the softening and the sectoralisation of European social dialogue turn it into “an alternative 
channel for lobbying” rather than resembling corporatist patterns of decision-making (de Boer, 
Benedictus and Meer 2005: 62).  
The autonomisation of the social dialogue is a consequence of the same kind of problems the 
Council faces when it seeks consensus on employment and social policy. After a period when 
social partner Framework Agreements were given legal effect by a Council decision and were 
transposed into the legislation of the member states, negotiations on other topics stalemated. In 
particularly since the beginning of 2000, little progress has been made towards new legislation 
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pressed to cooperate since the shadow of hierarchy is rather light – given the interest 
heterogeneity of national governments and the shift away from social democratic dominance, 
as one employer representative admits:  
“(…) the only motivation for employers’ organizations to take up negotiations is 
the threat of even more restrictive regulation, if it is left to the Commission and 
the EP. However, this negative motivation is rather weak and becomes less and 
less credible as a basis for the development of the negotiating practice at EU-
level from the employers’ perspective” (Hornung-Draus 2002: 218-219).  
As a result, there has been an increase in the conclusion of agreements that are autonomously 
implemented by the social partners and that no longer bind all employers and employees but 
only those covered by national collective agreements.  
In addition, even on the unions’ side, in countries with strong social partnership traditions such 
as Denmark, social partners were much in favour of turning towards autonomous social 
dialogue because this better reflects their national model (Leiber and Falkner 2006: 176-177, 
see also section 4). Thus, not only different welfare state models but also different national 
conceptions of social partnership/ industrial relations paved the way for soft governance tools 
in European social policy and social dialogue.  
Monitoring and implementation of these autonomous agreements differs significantly from 
those of negotiated legislation since there are no legally binding infringement procedures or 
sanctions through the EU Commission, the European Court of Justice or national enforcement 
authorities, but merely voluntary reporting (if any) (14). What is more, the reach of these 
agreements differs substantially across member states since the coverage of collective 
bargaining varies significantly. On average 62 percent of the employees in EU member states 
are covered by collective agreements, ranging from 12 percent in Lithuania to 100 percent in 
Slovenia (Figure 1). Hence, in many countries only a minority of workers will be covered if
there is no legislative backing. As a result, autonomous agreements lead to a patchwork of 
regulation (15).  
Figure 1 
Following a heyday in the course of the 1990s, European social dialogue did not quite fall back 
to its former insignificance of the 1970s and 1980s. It continued to gain importance in terms of 
discourse and the volume of activity. However, it is also moving in the direction of being non-
obligatory.  
4. The limits of new forms of governance in employment and social policy   
4.1. New and old modes of governance interact  
As previous sections have shown, new modes of governance have been an attempt to free EU 
social policy from gridlock. However, it is less clear whether these new modes are an effective 
way to advance social issues in Europe. To answer this question, we have to put the OMC and 
Social Dialogue into the broader context of different modes of governance prevalent in the EU. 
Scharpf (2001) distinguishes four types of governance that differ in the degree of 
institutionalisation:  
1. Mutual Adjustment,  
2. Intergovernmental Negotiations,  
3. Joint Decisions, and  
4. Hierarchical Direction.  
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Table 1 
Hierarchical Direction takes place where supranational actors act autonomously. In monetary 
policy, this is the European Central Bank and in competition policy the European Commission. 
But also the European Court of Justice not only interprets the law but has also become a 
legislating instance itself (Weiler 1991; Alter 1998). In the field of social policy, “hierarchy” is 
found above all in ECJ decisions on gender equality, which is anchored in EU primary law. In 
all of these cases, supranational actors do not depend on member states’ consent. In contrast, 
EU secondary law is only created when the Council passes Regulations or Directives 
submitted by the Commission. In many instances, the European Parliament also has to agree to 
the proposal. Hence, the Community Method is the prime example of Joint Decisions. EU 
legislation on the completion of the internal market – such as the Services Directive – or 
Regulation 883/2004 (formerly: 1408/71), which regulates social security for transnational 
workers but also minimum labour standards and Directives on gender equality are the result of 
such negotiation processes. Social partner Framework Agreements also conform to this mode 
of governance. In general, positive integration – whether it is market-making or market-
correcting – requires Joint Decisions. Once an agreement has been reached, Joint Decisions 
lead to binding legislation, monitored either by the Commission, the ECJ or national courts. In 
contrast, Intergovernmental Negotiations do not necessarily lead to legislation. While national 
policies are coordinated or standardised by unanimous agreements at the EU level, national 
governments remain in full control of the decision process, cannot be bound without 
consenting and also control the transposition of agreements into national law and their 
implementation (Scharpf 2001: 8). We contend that multilateral surveillance exemplifies this 
mode of governance. Although a host of European objectives is defined, member states remain 
exclusively responsible for their realisation. There are no sanctions available should they fail 
to stick to their promises other than naming and shaming (16). Finally, Mutual Adjustment 
prevails in policy areas that are subject to increased competition through the internal market, 
such as wages or corporate taxes.  
Any assessment of the potential and the limits of EU social dialogue and employment policy 
needs to be done in conjunction with a synopsis of these different modes of governance since 
they are not independent of each other. For example, monetary policy is highly effective in 
fighting inflation but it also puts pressure on wages and national labour market policies 
because neither exchange rate adjustments nor fiscal policies can counterbalance asymmetric 
shocks. EMU puts a premium on micro-economic strategies to fight unemployment. Clearly, 
the EES conforms to this supply-side approach. Similarly, ECJ rulings intensify tax 
competition (Ganghof and Genschel 2008) and expand mobility rights of workers and, lately, 
of EU citizens. In these cases, member states are forced to adjust national policies. In sum, 
there are a number of cross-cutting effects between different modes of governance.  
4.2. European Social Dialogue and national corporatism   
Ever since the 1980s the European Commission has promoted social dialogue. Both 
cooperation on the European level and coordination of national associations are supported by 
the EU. Each year the Commission accords approximately Euro 40 million to European social 
partners (17). However, empirical research on the effect of European social dialogue in the
member states offers mixed results (Leiber 2005). In most countries, “soft” Europeanization 
impulses promoted a somewhat stronger integration of the social partners. However, there are 
also unforeseen consequences pointing in an entirely different direction. In Denmark, 
management and labour were – in line with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty –
responsible for implementing EU social partner Directives. Yet, because Danish collective 
agreements do not cover the entire workforce and no erga omnes clause was in place, this 
implementation route was not compatible with earlier ECJ decisions. Paradoxically, in this 
case, EU social policy weakened social partner autonomy. As a consequence, Danish social 
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negotiated legislation to voluntary guidelines (Leiber and Falkner 2006: 176-177). Of course, 
the trade unions in Scandinavia are much less in need of EU support than other unions. 
Especially in many new member states social partnership takes place only under government 
supervision, if at all. The degree to which workers and above all of employers are organised is 
– in spite of Commission efforts – very limited (Kohl and Platzer 2003; Iankowa 2006). In
these cases, a well-functioning European social dialogue could underpin national social
partnership – but, as we have argued, it has by now lost momentum.  
The OMC was meant as another avenue for social partner involvement. Right from the 
inception of the EES social partners were asked to take part in the drafting of national action 
plans. Some guidelines specifically addressed them. Much of the early literature put forward 
the view that this would create more open and inclusive a way of decision-making. However, 
empirical research finds the reality of the OMC less promising:  
“The picture of social partner participation in the EES is shaky, despite the efforts 
made over time to improve their involvement. This is due not only to the 
financial resources and agenda mismatch, but also the lack of institutional 
rootedness of the EES within the national policy process” (de la Porte and Pochet 
2005: 371) (18).  
While the Commission’s capacity building efforts have had ambiguous effects, recent ECJ
decisions on Viking, Laval, and Rüffert clearly curtail the right of trade unions to defend 
national standards (Joerges and Rödl 2009). In fact, the ECJ keeps pushing negative 
integration ahead. In its decisions, the ECJ confirmed the unions’ right to engage in collective 
action in principle but at the same time held that any limitation of the four freedoms must be 
under the restriction of commensurability and can only be justified by overriding reason of 
public interest. In Laval and Viking the ECJ found these principles violated since trade union 
actions aimed at obtaining standards which went beyond the minimum established by law. The 
Court argued that industrial action discouraged companies to carry out business in other 
member state and therefore constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services (19). In 
Rüffert the ECJ argued that Article 49 EC precludes national or sub-national authorities from 
adopting measures that oblige companies to pay the remuneration defined by a collective 
agreement. The combined effect of these rulings is to impose limitations on any matters, 
including strikes, which could limit the rights under Articles 43 and 49 EC – even though the 
right to strike is a constitutional right in some member states. Accordingly, Bercusson (2007: 
308) concludes: “(…) the future of the trade union movement, but also of the EU, may depend 
on whether on judgment day the ECJ decides that the EU legal order upholds the right of trade 
unions to take transnational collective action”.  
Apart from these direct effects, indirect effects can be observed. For some years during the 
run-up to EMU it seemed that European integration reinvigorated national corporatism. Faced
with the accession criteria, the likely effect of a uniform monetary policy and increased 
competition, several member states saw either the creation or the renewal of Social Pacts 
(Hassel 2003; Enderlein 2006). This kind of supply-side corporatism took place even in 
countries without a corporatist tradition such as Ireland. However, in contrast to the 1970s, 
social pacts today result from labour’s weakness (Pochet and Fajertag 2000; Visser 2006).
While national corporatism apparently staged a comeback, the terms were entirely different 
from those of neo-corporatism’s heyday (Schäfer and Streeck 2008).  
In sum, the impact of European integration on the social partners – and especially on trade 
unions – is mixed at best. Even though genuinely new opportunities to influence policy were 
created, a number of countervailing forces exist, too. Thus, in the light of double voluntarism, 
the Commission’s aim to compensate for a weak state at the European level by strong social 
partners has only been achieved to a limited degree.  
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In addition, both the OMC and European social dialogue can easily fall prey to uncommitted 
actors. Since the party-political composition of most EU institutions and also the European 
Council has recently shifted away from the left (Figure 2), political support for the social 
dimension of the EU might no longer be forthcoming. To be sure, even during the phase of 
centre-left dominance this support was guarded and there was a fair amount of disagreement
within the social democratic/socialist party family. Nonetheless, most observers agree that the 
electoral shift towards the left just prior to the finalisation of the Amsterdam Treaty helped to 
put employment and social policy more firmly back on the EU’s agenda (e.g. Johansson 1999; 
Pollack 2000).  
Figure 2 
Quite clearly, Lionel Jospin and Tony Blair differed in their enthusiasm for European social 
policy, yet, both of them (and their parties) were more supportive of some progress than 
Margaret Thatcher or John Major had been – as the incorporation of the Maastricht Social 
Protocol into the main body of the Amsterdam Treaty showed. Hence, a shift of the party-
political centre of gravity matters for the support of the social dimension in Europe. The 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Luxembourg Employment Summit, the Nice Treaty, and the Lisbon 
Summit were all influenced by centre-left parties. However, while these parties did support a
higher EU profile in the struggle against unemployment and social exclusion, they differed in 
their national approaches; while it was easier to agree on certain ends, they nonetheless favour 
different means to achieve those. Hence, as we have argued above, they were ready to install 
non-binding coordination to improve cooperation in employment and social policy while, at
the same time, preserving national autonomy.  
What is more, the party-political complexion and the degree of heterogeneity of the Council
arguably influence how the social partners perceive the shadow of hierarchy. Given the rising 
tide of social democratic governments in the second half of the 1990s, employers might well 
have considered it advantageous to enter into negations with the trade unions (20). In recent 
years, however, not only the electoral fortune of the centre-left has changed but also member 
states have grown enormously heterogeneous with regard to national production regimes, 
welfare states and industrial relations models after enlargement (21). Empirical evidence 
shows that the number of social policy directives per years substantially dropped after 2004: 
while, on average, three directives were concluded between 1990 and 2004 only five directives 
came into force in the years 2005-2008 (Pochet and Degryse 2009: 96). It may be too early to 
tell whether this trend will last. However, the argument of the article would hold even if it did 
not last. We do not assume that soft law displaces existing hard law but rather that 
governments since the late 1990s have failed to increase the scope of the latter in primary law. 
Instead they have relied on soft coordination, peer pressure, learning and monitoring etc. This 
shift towards voluntarist policy-making has recently been mirrored by the social partners who 
also supplement solemn declarations for binding agreements. Hence, we speak of a “double 
voluntarism” in EU social policy.  
5. Conclusions   
In this article we analysed how a number of innovative procedures have emerged in EU 
employment and social policy over the last two decades. Arguably, these attempts to centralise 
“society”  by strengthening social partnership were a response to political stalemate in the
Council. The EU is an extremely decentralised polity in which decisions require the support of 
many diverse actors in different arenas. Accordingly, progress in the social dimension of 
European integration was limited prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, which increasingly 
frustrated those who favoured regulated capitalism. Hence, first Commission president Jacques 
Delors and later a number of social democratic governments sought alternative ways to place 
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modes of governance was an attempt to find middle ground between uncoordinated national 
action and a transfer of competencies to the European level.  
Multilateral surveillance – based on common targets, national implementation, peer review, 
and regular stock taking – turned out to be an ingenious solution to the need to cooperate and
the desire to stay in control of highly salient policies. As a result, the Open Method of 
Coordination mushroomed in such diverse fields as social inclusion, pensions, research & 
development, or innovation policies. National governments are quite ready to assent to 
procedures that do not necessitate action and that circumscribe supranational actors’ ability to 
interfere with national decisions. In the meantime, soft coordination has also spread to 
European social dialogue, substituting non-binding declarations of intent for “social partner 
Directives.” In the past decade, cross-industry social dialogue has no longer lead to EU 
legislation. Instead, management and labour also increasingly rely on voluntary agreements, 
monitoring, and the exchange of information. Therefore, we speak of a “double voluntarism”
that not only delegates the responsibility for social policy to the social partners but also favours 
soft law over binding legislation. Since not only the member states but also national social 
partners have grown more diverse with enlargement, the EU is a decentralised polity facing a 
highly fragmented society and therefore lacking the benign features of a semisovereign state. 
Thus, building strong social partners to compensate for a weak state in order to overcome 
deadlock and to compensate for the dispersion of state power seems unavailable for the 
European Union.  
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Endnotes  
(*) For numerous helpful comments we would like to thank Adrienne Héritier, two reviewers and, in 
particular, Sandra Kröger.  
(1) The article concentrates on social partners as an important part of organised civil society. For a broader 
analysis of civil society conceptions in the European Commission see e.g. Michel (2008). The term “social 
partners” is used here in the same way as the European Commission does. It refers to the umbrella 
organisations of unions and employer associations in individual EU member states and on the EU level.  
(2) On the concept of voluntarism, see Streeck (1995a).  
(3) Yet, one can ask whether top-down attempts of society-building are promising and, in fact, desirable. 
Despite Fligstein’s (2008) claim to the contrary, it is one of the problems of the European polity that most
associations still are firmly embedded in their national context. As section 4 indicates, EU society-building 
may well have unintended (unforeseen and unwelcomed) consequences.  
(4) For an encompassing literature review see Kröger (in this issue).  
(5) Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) detect forms of experimentation and learning in a wide range of areas and hence 
speak of a new governance architecture in the EU.  
(6) For the application of similar procedures in the OECD and the International Monetary Fund, see Schäfer 
(2006a).  
(7) This is made up of employer representatives, unions and various associations from agriculture, the trades, 
small and middle sized companies, freelance professions and science together and must be heard on all 
commission suggestions.  
(8) Today Busines Europe.  
(9) The European social dialogue received formal recognition by the Single European Act’s insertion into the 
EC Treaty of a new Article 118B EC.  
(10) The reason for this parallelism is that the Belgian delegation to the Maastricht Intergovernmental 
Conference successfully managed to present its own national model as a blueprint for the EU (for further 
details see Falkner 1998: 89-96).  
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http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-009a.htm 16(11) For an encompassing overview of the activities of the cross-industry social dialogue following Maastricht 
within the context of Articles 138-139 of the EUT, cf. Leiber and Falkner (2006); European Commission
(2008).  
(12) On 18 June 2009, however, the European social partners made progress in adopting an agreement 
revising their 1995 Framework Agreement on parental leave. The next step will be for the European 
Commission to propose implementation of the revised agreement through a new Council Directive, but this 
process is not yet concluded.  
(13) See: http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/Depliant_EN_HD2006-2008.pdf (accessed on October 21, 2009).  
(14) If the autonomous agreement is related to a EU proposal, the Commission may verify the implementation 
and make a new proposal if the implementation is not considered to be properly fulfilled.  
(15) For the implementation of the telework agreement see Martín and Visser (2008).  
(16) Soft procedures can have the effect of creating markets as well as correcting markets. The labour market 
policy recommendations of EES and BEPG primarily aim at the former. However, in the area of social 
security the effect is less clear. Goals such as “sustainable finances” – geared towards cost containment for 
pensions or health care – coexist with provisions to enhance the quality of social security, such as the
“adequacy of pension levels” or access to “high quality health care.”  
(17) The Commission spent Euro 13.1 million for the promotion of social dialogue in 2008. A further 14.4 
million Euro was spent on “Information and training measures for workers’ organisations” and another 7.3 
million Euro for the “information, consultation and participation of representatives of undertakings”. Finally, 
trade unions received 400,000 Euro for preparatory consultation meeting. All details are taken from the 
overall budget for 2008: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2008_VOL4/EN/index.html (accessed on April 
6, 2009).  
(18) See also Natali and de la Porte (2009).  
(19) However, no legal minimum wages exist in Denmark or Sweden, as they are implemented via collective 
agreement. This prerogative of the social partners is an essential feature of the Nordic social model.  
(20) Although we lack direct empirical evidence that this was the case, the developments described in section 
three lend support to this interpretation and invite further research on this question.  
(21) What is more, many centre-left parties to date endorse market-making policies. For an in-depth analysis 
of the failure of Social Democrats to foster “Social Europe” see Bailey (2009). 
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Table 1: Mode of Governance in the EU Economic and Social Policy 
* Effect is less clear 
Figure 1: Collective Bargaining Coverage in EU member states, 2006 
Source: ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and
Social Pacts in 34 countries between1960 and 2007. http://www.uva-aias.net/207 Greece & Hungary: 2005;
Slovenia: 2003.  
  
  
  Effect 
Mode of Governance market-making market-correcting
Hierarchical Direction
Monetary policy; 
Competition policy (merger 
and state aid control);
Gender Equality (TEC)
Joint Decisions 
(Community Method)
Common Market Directives 
(e.g. Services Directive) 
Social protection for mobile 
workers who cross national 
borders 
Gender Equality (Guidelines) 
Labour legislation, conditions 
and protection (Incl. social 
partnership guidelines) European 
Social Fund 
Intergovernmental 
Negotiations (governments 
remain in control of the 
decision)
Labour Market Policies* 
(Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines; European 
Employment Strategy) 
Social security* and social 
inclusion* (Open Method of 
Coordination) 
Mutual adjustment 
(Competition through non-
decisions) 
Wages; Corporate Taxes Product regulation
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Figure 2: Centre-left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts in all EU member 
states 
Data: Armingeon et al. (2008): Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2006. 
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